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A RESHUFFLING MARKET: THE PACIFIC COAST LEAGUE’S
EFFORTS TO BECOME A THIRD MAJOR LEAGUE AND HOW
THE BRAVES MADE MILWAUKEE FAMOUS
BY
MICHAEL E. LOMAX

In 1953, the Boston Braves relocated to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, marking the first
time a major league franchise moved in fifty years. The Braves’ relocation ushered in
major league baseball’s first phase of expansion – the relocation phase. By May 20, the
Braves matched its entire 1952 attendance (281,000) and finished the season with an
impressive 1.8 million. In 1954, the Braves topped two million en route to become one
of the prominent franchises in the 1950s.
Research regarding the Boston Braves’ move to Milwaukee has been minimal.
The overwhelming focus has been on St. Louis Browns’ owner Bill Veeck’s effort to
relocate his club to Milwaukee, in the midst of stiff opposition from his fellow league
owners. Braves’ owner Lou Perini owned the Triple A Milwaukee Brewers of the
American Association. When Veeck attempted to purchase the Brewers from Perini,
Commissioner Ford Frick used his influence to block the move. With Veeck blocked on
every side, National League (NL) owners allowed Perini to relocate to Milwaukee for the
start of the 1953 season. 1
This research has enhanced our knowledge regarding major league baseball
entering its expansion era. However, what is often overlooked was the Pacific Coast
League’s (PCL) six-year attempt to become a third major league from 1945 to 1951, and
how their failed effort influenced the expansion process. The internal reshuffling of
major league baseball’s governance and the reclassification of the minor leagues has also
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been virtually unexplored. Moreover, scholars acknowledge that the city of Milwaukee
had built a municipal stadium for approximately $5 million, making the “German
Athens” a coveted territory for relocation. However, they have yet to investigate the
efforts made by civic leaders and local businessmen to build a stadium and lure a major
league franchise there. This paper analyzes the forces that led to both the Pacific Coast
League’s efforts to become a third major league, and the Boston Braves relocating to
Milwaukee, ushering in major league baseball’s relocation phase. Two questions will
serve to guide the narrative: how did the PCL’s efforts to become a third major league
influence major league baseball’s expansion process; and what were the forces, both
internal and external, that impacted upon the construction of Milwaukee County Stadium.
The paper will also trace the Boston Braves move to Milwaukee and analyze the
importance civic leaders and local businessmen placed on obtaining “major league”
status to redefine its national identity in the 1950s.
At the forefront were the major league owners’ attempts to either maintain their
existing monopoly or control the expansion process. In 1945, the Pacific Coast League
sought to elevate their circuit to a major league classification. The move was in response
to a previous effort made by the St. Louis Browns to relocate to Los Angeles and the
post-World War II prosperity, which made the West the fastest growing region of the
country. At the same time, civic boosters in Los Angeles attempted to urge the major
leagues to either relocate one of its struggling franchises to their growing city, or expand
their league structure to include the “City of Angels.” Yet in some ways being the fastest
growing region worked against the PCL’s effort to become a third major league, and the
civic boosters’ attempts to lure an existing franchise.

Los Angeles grew
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disproportionately larger than the other western cities. The major league owners rejected
these overtures and established a policy whereby an individual owner could relocate their
franchise to a new market, if they were willing to bear the expense and make the
necessary negotiations. A determining factor for major league expansion was the size of
the ballparks and adequate parking. While the stadium became a critical factor that
dramatically influenced the expansion process, it still required a significant degree of
external pressure to coerce the owners to expand. The culmination of both a threat of
congressional action and Supreme Court intervention, and the overall decline in
attendance resulted in the major league owners coming to grips with expansion. 2
Concurrently, civic leaders in Milwaukee undertook a project to build a municipal
stadium. The purpose of the project was to erect a memorial to honor the soldiers who
died in World War I. By the end of World War II, however, the stadium project became
an integral part of civic leaders and politicians’ efforts to revitalize Milwaukee’s cultural
infrastructure. It also served to shatter the city’s “minor league” image and redefine its
national identity. Civic leaders and politicians envisioned a windfall of revenue for their
growing metropolis as a result of housing the Braves. Yet it still required a significant
degree of external pressure from the city fathers to encourage Boston Braves owner Lou
Perini to move there. Unlike civic leaders in Los Angeles, Milwaukee’s politicians and
boosters formed a strong coalition to bring big league ball there. While these politicians
and civic boosters probably overestimated the potential revenue a major league franchise
could bring to their city, their endeavors exemplified the willingness of post-World War
II cities offering incentives to these owners to hard to refuse. Moreover, the Braves’
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relocation to Milwaukee marked the start of a dramatic restructuring of Major League
Baseball’s (MLB) consumer market into its current configuration.

From 1903 to 1953, professional baseball was a relatively stable industry. At the
peak of this professional structure were the major leagues – the American and National –
and a host of minor leagues according to quality. A complex set of rules and agreements
between and within various leagues, known as “baseball law,” regulated a vertically
integrated monopoly known as “Organized Baseball.” The fundamental underpinning of
these rules was a number of restrictive practices that formed the governance and
economics of the industry. 3
The reserve clause represented a unique part of the contract between baseball
clubs and their employees. It bound a player to their respective club until traded, sold, or
released. Every club in Organized Baseball agreed not to employ or attempt to employ
any player reserved by another club. The owners agreeing to respect each other’s players
bound by the reserve rule gave the owners a hegemonious relationship over their player
force.
The division of consumer markets among clubs constituted Organized Baseball’s
second most restrictive practice. Also referred to as “territorial rights,” this market
monopoly was instituted on the supposition that consumer demand for professional
baseball was limited. As a result, only one club would have a far better chance of
prospering than if several clubs competed for the same market. Although it would be
modified over the years, the owners’ established a population requirement – 75,000 in the
late nineteenth century – for a club to gain league entry. A five-mile radius surrounding
the respective city was also considered as that club’s territorial region. Territorial rights
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did not solve the problem of the unequal size of markets among the clubs of a league.
However, this market imbalance was offset somewhat by the wealth and population of
industrial America, as well as the best transportation system, residing in the Northeast.
Virtually all of the major league teams were located in this comparatively compact and
economically developed region of the country. Being concentrated in this area enabled
major league baseball to deal with the damaging impact of two world wars and the Great
Depression. 4
The sixteen major league clubs were both business partners and competitors.
They cooperated in the creation of a general set of operating rules, developing common
playing schedules, and by eliminating competition for players. Major League owners
also cooperated in attempting to maintain public faith in the sport’s integrity. This issue
became crucial after the 1919 Black Sox scandal, in which Chicago players cooperated
with gamblers in fixing the World Series. The owners created the commissioner’s office
to reassure the public that the game was honest.
The 1922 Supreme Court ruling – the Federal League case – 259 US 200 –
solidified major league baseball’s control over its economic environment. The Court
ruled that baseball was not a form of interstate commerce, thus not subject to antitrust
laws. Exemption from prosecution under antitrust laws gave baseball a unique status.
Organized Baseball became a self-regulating monopoly and the major leagues wrote the
rules that covered their relationship with the minor leagues. The most critical business
relationship between the major and minor leagues was the draft system. While the
number of their supporting minor leagues fluctuated, the minors provided the major
leagues with a large pool of cheap talent. The annual draft of minor league players
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ensured that quality talent advanced up the ladder toward the majors, but this movement
was contingent upon terms favorable to the big leagues. The major leagues fixed prices
on drafted players as an incentive for minor league owners to sell their best players,
rather than losing them in the less profitable draft. 5
The culmination of the antitrust exemption, the reserve clause, and territorial
rights represented the cornerstone of baseball’s system of self-regulation for profit. The
reserve clause enabled member clubs to control the terms of employment of their
respective players. Major League owners allocated consumer markets by sharing New
York, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, and St. Louis. The National League was granted
exclusive rights in Brooklyn, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati, and the American in
Washington, Cleveland, and Detroit. These territorial alignments remained intact for half
a century.
Not all major league clubs enjoyed this sense of stability, however. The St. Louis
Browns of the American League (AL) were, according to historian James Edward Miller,
“baseball’s by word for futility and mediocrity.” In fifty-two years the Browns won one
AL pennant, finished second twice, sixth eleven times, seventh twelve times, and last ten
times. The Browns’ attendance reflected this performance. From 1932 to 1936, they
averaged a little more than 98,000 fans a year, and according to historian William
Marshall, only 34 fans attended a game in 1933. Browns’ owner Phil Ball died that same
year, depriving the club of a magnate who was rich enough to subsidize the team and
willing to take financial losses. The executors of Ball’s estate refused to invest more
capital in a losing ball club. In 1934, the club finished sixth and lost a reported $54,000.
The following year the Browns finished seventh and drew 80,922 fans. 6
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In 1936, the executors sold the Browns to a contingent headed by Donald Barnes,
owner of an investment firm, and William O. and Charles DeWitt. The new owners
raised $100,000 to pay for the club by selling stock, and the American League loaned
them an additional $50,000 to complete the deal. In their first four years under new
management, the Browns lost over $100,000 each year. Bill DeWitt, the club’s general
manager, had devised a sound strategy to build the Browns into a pennant contender –
hiring scouts, building a farm system, and acquiring major league talent from other
teams. However, the Browns’ management simply lacked the financial residuals to
achieve their goals.
In 1941, the Browns’ financial picture was so bleak that Barnes attempted to
transfer the franchise to Los Angeles. In a 1949 Sporting News interview, the Browns
owner unfolded the details of this huge undertaken that began in mid-season. According
to Barnes, Harry Arthur, president of the Fanchon & Marco Amusement Company,
approached him several times regarding a possible shift to the West Coast. Arthur
reportedly told Barnes that there were interested parties who, from a civic standpoint,
were willing to bring major league baseball to the West Coast. Barnes flew to Los
Angeles and met with a group of civic leaders, headed by A. P. Giannini, co-founder of
Bank of America. The Browns owner informed the group that he would be willing to sell
them part of the stock in the club to finance a deal to purchase the Los Angeles Angels of
the Pacific Coast League. This transaction was essential to gain the territorial rights so
the AL club could move there. 7
Barnes then met with several AL owners and Chicago Cubs mogul Phillip K.
Wrigley. AL owners Connie Mack (Philadelphia Athletics), Clark Griffith (Washington
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Senators), and Tom Yawkey (Boston Red Sox) expressed concerns over the safety of the
players, since the Browns’ transfer would require the clubs to make trips to the coast by
air travel. Nevertheless, according to Barnes, the AL magnates gave him the green light
to explore the possibility of moving the Browns. In October 1941, Barnes met with
Wrigley to negotiate a deal to purchase the Los Angeles franchise. After considerable
negotiation, Wrigley was willing to sell the franchise, the players on the Angels’ roster,
and Wrigley Field for a reported $1,000,000.
Next, Barnes underwent a series of negotiations with St. Louis Cardinals owner,
Sam Breadon. The Browns owned Sportsman Park and they had invested heavily in a
new scoreboard, and five years remained on their rental agreement with the Cardinals.
According to the terms of the agreement, Breadon would pay the Browns $250,000 to
leave St. Louis, give them two players valued at $25,000 each, and assume the Browns’
leasing agreement with the Dodier Realty Company. At the same time, Breadon would
attempt to influence the NL owners to approve the Browns transfer.

Baseball law

required a unanimous consent from the owners of both leagues to approve a franchise
shift. Moreover, the NL owners would probably have no qualms about the Browns
moving to Los Angeles. St. Louis would become the exclusive territory of the National
League. 8
While Barnes maneuvered within MLB’s infrastructure, Harry Arthur made
preparations for the Browns’ transfer to Los Angeles. The Angels would be transferred
to Long Beach, where civic leaders made assurances that a park would be erected, once
the city was awarded the franchise. The other PCL franchise, the Hollywood Stars, was
given the option to remain or relocate. If the Stars stayed, the Browns would cooperate in
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devising a schedule that would not conflict with each other. Moreover, the Los Angeles
Junior Chamber of Commerce went on record guaranteeing an annual attendance of
500,000 for five years. If the Browns attendance did not reach this figure, the Chamber
of Commerce would underwrite the difference.
Barnes drew up a new playing schedule for the 1942 season and devised a travel
agenda to ease the concerns of his fellow owners. On December 6, 1941, Barnes and the
DeWitt brothers met with K. O. Cocke, vice-president of sales for Trans World Airlines
(TWA), to finalize the travel plans. Railroad officials from the Santa Fe Chief also
attended the meeting. Reportedly, each club would make three trips to the West Coast,
but only one trip would be made by air travel. Chicago was the “jumping-off” place for
all flights and between 21 and 28 flights took off daily from the Windy City to Los
Angeles. Therefore, no club was compelled to place all of its players on one or two
planes. In other words, players could have been transported at the rate of one, two, three,
or four per flight, so there would be no danger of losing an entire club, or a major portion
of it, in an air disaster. According to the airline officials, 98 percent of all flights during
the baseball season completed their trips. League clubs would use the Santa Fe Chief for
the other trips. The revised schedule provided an open date the day before a league club
was scheduled to come to California. The Browns’ management was also willing to
underwrite a portion of the AL clubs’ travel expenses for at least five years. Since the
Junior Chamber of Commerce guaranteed an attendance of 500,000, the Browns were
prepared to pay each visiting club an additional 25 cents per head over the pay-off
required by the American League. In other words, the Browns would add an additional
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25 cents per admission to the visiting team’s share of the gate receipts or the guarantee,
which ever was greater. 9
The following day Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and America entered World War
II. Any aspirations of moving the St. Louis Browns to Los Angeles came to an abrupt
end.

On December 9 at the American League’s winter meeting, the owners voted

unanimously against the Browns proposed transfer to Los Angeles. Barnes also voted
against the move. When asked why he went along with the other owners after seriously
considering the move, Barnes replied: “After submitting the proposal and after hearing
the discussion relative to it by the league in general, I decided along with other members
of the league that it would be best to vote to retain the Browns in St. Louis.” 10
Clearly America’s entry into the war thwarted the Browns move to Los Angeles.
Wartime controls on fuel and transportation made any westward move impractical.
However, the Browns aborted to move to Los Angeles illustrated the complexities
involved in relocating a franchise to a new market. An owner attempting to move his
club required him to establish a political coalition among his fellow owners. Without this
contingent, he could never receive the necessary votes to move. If the owner desired to
move into a new territory owned by another major league magnate, it was necessary to
acquire the territorial rights, transfer or purchase the minor league players, and buy or
lease the stadium. The magnate would have to dispose the tangible assets within their
current territory – primarily the stadium. Adjustments would have to be made to the
league’s playing schedule, in terms of revising the road trips and travel itineraries.
Barnes’s travel schedule appears awkward by today’s standards, but jet air travel was
something new to a generation of owners whose primary mode of transportation was by
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rail. Therefore, their reluctance to embrace this manner of travel was understandable.
The task of relocating a franchise was a huge and expensive undertaking.
Since the Browns were a financially weak franchise, they needed assistance from
the city seeking a major league club. A booster coalition, in the form of civic leaders,
businessmen, and politicians, was essential in making the transfer a reality. Boosterism
has had a long history in sport.

Local boosters used sport as a valuable tool for

community enhancement. Promoters took on the task of promoting their communities in
order to attract capital investment and political visibility. They were eternal optimist,
growth oriented, and willing to take risks. Boosters were drawn to baseball because of its
ability to generate visibility and support. Evidently, luring the Browns to Los Angeles
was part of a larger aspiration to place the national spotlight on the City of Angels. Los
Angeles Examiner sportswriter Davis Walsh speculated whether the “interested parties”
Barnes referred to were the same men responsible for bringing the national golf
championship to the city in 1942. 11
By 1940, Los Angeles was one of the fastest growing cities in America and it
became a dominant city in its region. Defense spending stimulated the city’s rapid
growth during and after the war, as the federal government spent $30 billion on direct
defense spending in the West.

The defense industry was also the catalyst for a

spectacular growth in the population and allowed for new uses of urban space – urban
renewal for minorities and stadium construction to lure a professional franchise. The
population growth was phenomenal, as 500 new residents per day moved to Los Angeles
between 1945 and 1955 for a ten-year total of 1,725,000 migrants. By 1950 Los Angeles
was almost 38% of California’s population. Moreover, the city represented the kinds of
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demographic changes occurring in American cities, particularly in the West, that would
alter Organized Baseball’s consumer market. 12
“Interested parties” in Los Angeles continued to make efforts to bring major
league baseball to the West Coast. The Browns aborted move to the coast, however,
evidently disturbed several club owners in the Pacific Coast League. The PCL had long
been recognized as one of the premier minor league circuits. The PCL played the longest
schedule in Organized Baseball, as many as 225 games a season. Major League stars like
Frank “Lefty” O’Doul, Tony Lazzeri, and Joe DiMaggio played in the PCL.

On

December 5, 1945, the Los Angeles Times reported that PCL club members voted
unanimously to make their organization a “full major league.” A three-man committee
headed by league president Clarence “Pants” Rowland, San Francisco club president
Charley Graham, and Hollywood president Victor Ford Collins led the effort to elevate
their organization to a major league, beginning in the 1946 season. Acquiring major
league status was contingent upon the approval by the commissioner, the two major
league presidents, and the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues – the
governing body of the minor leagues. The three-man committee sought to obtain major
league status within the parameters of baseball law. 13
Concurrently, both the major and minor leagues underwent a dramatic reshuffling.
Albert B. “Happy” Chandler was elected commissioner after the death of Kennesaw
Mountain Landis in November 1944. From the outset, several owners attempted to usurp
Chandler’s powers as commissioner. The former Governor and Senator from Kentucky
defeated several moves to reduce his power, and he stood up to the owners and won
approval of his programs. At baseball’s winter meetings, the minor leagues voted to strip
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Chandler of his veto power and remove baseball’s promotional activities from his office.
Major League owners refused to support the minors’ actions and instead approved one of
the commissioner’s pet projects, a rule prohibiting baseball from signing high school
players unless they had been out of school for more than a year. The minor leagues also
created a new Triple A classification. Leagues would be classified as either A, AA, or
AAA. The PCL, the International League, and the American Association were elevated
to Triple A status. The new classification put a higher price on players selected in the
annual draft and established new salary and player limits. 14
Despite its new classification, the PCL continued to push for major league status.
On December 8, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that the minor league executives
approved the PCL’s request to become a third major league, and they would be
“welcomed back” if the American and National Leagues rejected their application. From
the outset, Rowland recognized that a status change did not make his PCL a “major
league.” He did not ask that the PCL champion play the winner of the World Series, nor
did he claim that club owners were ready to pay major league salaries, which averaged
$9,000 more than the coast league. As a major league, the PCL would not be placed in
the unenviable position of selling its star players to avoid the draft. Moreover, major
league baseball’s consumer market would be increased significantly. Collectively, eight
PCL clubs had a population of over four million and the west was undoubtedly one of the
fastest growing regions of the country.

Hollywood Stars business manager Oscar

Reichnow pointed out that the PCL’s attendance had tripled from one million in the
prewar seasons to three million in 1945. 15
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Despite these factors, the American and National Leagues refused to consider the
PCL’s application to become a third major league. Both leagues took a dim view of this
West Coast circuit cutting into their exclusive territory. However, they soften their
stance somewhat by acknowledging the PCL as a “potential major league territory.”
League presidents Will Harridge (AL) and Ford Frick (NL) issued a joint statement
outlining the criteria for gaining major league status. Their press release typified the kind
of rhetoric major league owners and officials uttered in the postwar era. Both presidents
stated that a name change did not constitute major league status. According to Harridge
and Frick, a host of factors would have to be considered in order to become a major
league. They also asserted the need to address a critical factor that would dramatically
influence the expansion process – the size of the ballparks and adequate parking. 16
In response to the joint statement, Rowland declared that the PCL would return
“and it will not be with hat in hand but with a straight-from-the-shoulder demand that we
be given the right to offer our people that to which they were justly entitled – major
league baseball.”

He added that the major league owners were “postponing the

inevitable,” as millions of baseball-minded people in California, Washington, and Oregon
wanted better than minor league baseball. Moreover, PCL officials could not accomplish
their ambition to become a third major league while dealing with the draft, or facing the
forced sale of star players to avoid the draft. Undoubtedly, this factor, along with the
Browns’ aborted move to Los Angeles five years earlier, influenced the PCL’s efforts to
become a third major league. 17
The following year Rowland made a second effort to obtain major league status
for his PCL. At the major league meetings in July, Rowland ask for a new classification

15
as “The Pacific Major League,” and for an exemption from the major league clubs to
purchase the best PCL players for a maximum price of $10,000. Rowland argued that the
PCL deserved special consideration because it was more than a Triple A league. Its
attendance exceeded the combined totals of the International League and the American
Association. By the end of the 1946 season, PCL attendance leaped to 3.7 million fans.
Moreover, Rowland also wanted to protect the league “from the vultures who would like
to descend on their little golden lode.” 18
Simultaneously, several spokesmen from Los Angeles, including County
Supervisor Leonard Roach and Los Angeles Examiner sportswriter Vincent Flaherty,
revived efforts to lure a major league franchise. From as early as December 1945,
Flaherty had been campaigning for a major league franchise for Los Angeles. In a survey
of PCL sportswriters, Flaherty reportedly said in the Sporting News that the PCL could
not hope to compete with the two major leagues due to a lack of capital. He pointed out,
however, that the coast league had two major league cities in Los Angeles and San
Francisco. With the war ended, the prospect of relocating the St. Louis Browns to Los
Angeles was being reconsidered. These efforts conflicted with Rowland’s effort to
achieve major league status for all of its members, including those in smaller markets.
The loss of either Los Angeles or San Francisco would threaten the league’s market
potential. This external pressure fueled the Coast League officials’ determination that the
major leagues would come west through the upgrading of the entire league, instead of
relocating an existing major league franchise to a single city. The possibility of a Browns
move to Los Angeles posed a serious threat. 19
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In response to Roach and Flaherty’s efforts to lure a major league franchise, PCL
officials sought a revision in the rules to protect their league from possible invasion.
Concurrently, they voted again to press its efforts to become a third major league. The
Los Angeles Times reported that PCL officials began the initial attempt to increase
stadium size and provide adequate parking. Once major league recognition was granted,
all league clubs pledged to expand their facilities and “improve the standards of [their]
teams...” Construction of new parks had supposedly begun in Portland and San Diego. 20
Once again major league owners thwarted the PCL’s efforts to become a third
major league. A compromise solution was reached whereby the major leagues postponed
recognizing the PCL as a major league for five years. In return, the major leagues would
support the PCL’s desire for territorial protection. The PCL could also retain any player
drafted, if the circuit matched the salary the drafting club offered. However, major
league owners reneged on the promise of territorial protection.

Instead, the majors

agreed that a league club could move into the PCL’s territory by either compensating the
people involved, or both parties accept a negotiated figure arrived through arbitration.
More important, in the midst of postwar prosperity, it was evident the major league
owners did not want to take on additional partners. 21
On the other hand, Supervisor Roach and Flaherty’s attempts to bring major
league baseball to Los Angeles were frustrated by the territorial rules of baseball law.
Los Angeles was the property of Chicago Cubs owner Phil Wrigley. If a struggling
franchise, like the St. Louis Browns, wanted to move to the coast, they would have to
purchase the franchise rights from Wrigley, the ballpark, and possibly the players on the
Angels’ roster. They would also have to make an indemnity payment to the PCL for their
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loss franchise.

Considering the Browns’ weak financial condition, the city of Los

Angeles, no doubt, would have to bear some of the expense of moving them there. In
addition, there was no evidence to indicate that these boosters mounted a campaign to
either build a new stadium to adhere to “major league standards,” or renovate Wrigley
Field. If they chose to renovate Wrigley Field then the city would have to purchase the
ballpark from the Cubs owner. The Los Angeles Coliseum was the only alternative site,
but playing there was still contingent upon buying the franchise rights from Wrigley.
Furthermore, the Coliseum was more suited for football than baseball. In any event,
franchise relocation represented an expensive and complex undertaking.
In 1947, PCL officials made a third request to obtain major league recognition.
Led by San Francisco Seals president Charles Graham, the Coast delegation requested
that the PCL be granted a three-to-five year trial as a major league and that the magnates
suspend their draft of the league’s players, to enable them to develop a reservoir of toplevel talent. But the owners referred the PCL’s petition to baseball’s executive council,
who planned to make a trip to the West Coast to survey the region for possible expansion.
Supposedly, the trip would also determine whether the PCL warranted suspending the
draft of their players. 22
Major League owners also referred Supervisor Roach’s second attempt to lure an
existing franchise to Los Angeles to the executive council. Reportedly, Roach had
invited the council to Los Angeles to persuade them on the merits of bringing big league
baseball there.

He claimed to represent every civic organization in the southern

California city. In an open letter to Commissioner Chandler, Roach indicated that a
prospective franchise would play their home games in the Los Angeles Coliseum. The
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executive council, however, scheduled no meeting with Roach. According to the New
York Times, Chandler told reporters: “We are here as the Coast League’s guests and our
only consideration at present is the proposals they have made.” In addition, Lieutenant
Governor Goodwin Knight supported the PCL’s desire for major league consideration
and reportedly said, “We are completely past the bush-league stage.” Such comments
appear to marginalize Roach’s assertion that he represented every civic organization in
the city. 23
By November, the Pacific Coast League modified its position and asked for a
classification above Triple A status, with aspirations of gaining major league status in
three-to-five years. Under this new classification, the Coast League would be under the
jurisdiction of Commissioner Chandler and the executive council. PCL officials also
requested a name change to the “Pacific Coast Major League,” an increase in the draft
price from $10,000 to $25,000, and the draft eligibility be raised from four to six years.
These requests were consistent with the PCL’s desire to develop a reservoir of playing
talent to major league standards. 24
The Pacific Coast League suffered a serious setback at both the minor and major
league winter meetings.

Led by the American Association, the minor leagues

unanimously rejected the PCL’s resolution. Association President Frank Lane summed
up the minors’ disdain for the PCL’s request by stating: “Why don’t they quit trying to
kid everybody else, including themselves?” He added: “Under their proposal they’d be
neither fish nor fowl.” According to the New York Times, International League President
Frank Shaughnessy had publicly blasted the idea several times.

Despite this stiff

opposition, the minors gave the PCL permission to continue their attempts to become a
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third major league. As the Los Angeles Times astutely noted, the minors would probably
“stand pat on that attitude, letting the majors apply the ax.” 25
On December 11, at the American and National League’s joint session, the
owners rejected the PCL’s petition for major league recognition on a trial basis for a third
time. Instead, the magnates adopted a resolution that left “the door open” for possible
territorial expansion and eventually expanding their league structure from eight to ten
clubs. Commissioner Chandler proposed the idea of expanding both leagues, with the
possibility of adding Los Angeles, Hollywood, San Francisco, and Oakland. However,
according to the New York Times, both leagues were divided on the issue, with the
National League voting unanimously for a ten-club circuit. However, the American
League voted five to two against the plan, with Cleveland abstaining. 26
Understandably, the major league owners positioned themselves to control any
plans to expand their circuits within the parameters of baseball law. Nothing illustrated
their intention more than their press release to the public: “...while the majors again shut
down the Coast League bid for major rating in toto, they [the owners] left an opening for
individuals members to seek major league entry. Such actions, however, must be initiated
by those clubs which would have to assume all cost and responsibility.” Yet by the same
token, the owners could not ignore the fact that the West Coast was the fastest growing
region in the country, and their weak franchises in St. Louis and Boston (NL) were a
cause of concern. Were the major league owners seriously considering expanding their
league structure or relocating their weak franchises? Several factors suggest that the
magnates were more concern with sustaining their monopoly and maintaining the status
quo. 27
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Major League Baseball’s immediate postwar attendance boom constituted the first
factor. The Pacific Coast League attempted to gain major league recognition at a time
when the majors experienced unprecedented prosperity. Before World War II 10 million
fans for all of major league baseball represented a banner year. In 1946, attendance rose
to 18.5 million and reached 20 million in 1948 and 1949. Weak franchises, like the
Philadelphia Athletics and Washington Senators, profited during this period. In the midst
of this attendance boom, the last thing major league owners wanted was additional
partners. 28
Second, nothing illustrated the owners’ monopoly behavior more than the way
they dealt with the new medium – television. While television was of great importance
for baseball’s future, televised broadcasting was still in its formative stage in the late
1940s and early 1950s. Local broadcasting of baseball began in 1946. Three years later,
the National Broadcasting Company developed the first limited “network” to telecast a
World Series along the East Coast. The fundamental issue was to what extent Organized
Baseball could exert control over this new technology. Baseball took its initial steps after
World War II toward control by enacting Rule 1(d). This baseball law prohibited clubs
from broadcasting into another major or minor league territory. It also prevented a
visiting team from broadcasting from the home club’s stadium without permission.
Organized Baseball showed its determination to regulate the broadcasting of its games by
killing the Liberty Broadcasting System (LBS). The LBS represented the first effort to
establish a national radio sport broadcasting network.

Cooperation with Organized

Baseball was critical for the LBS’s survival. In response, the major leagues invoked Rule
1(d), banning the LBS from re-broadcasting their games in minor league territory.
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National League attorney Louis Carroll told a House committee that Organized Baseball
crushed the LBS, firmly establishing the principle that it enjoyed control over
broadcasting rights. 29
A final factor dealt with the rise of the Mexican League, an outlaw circuit. In
1946, seventeen players jumped their major league contracts for promises of higher
wages. New York Giants outfielder Danny Gardella was among the seventeen players
who made the jump across the border. Commissioner Chandler declared the contract
jumpers ineligible, blacklisting those players for five years. After playing one season in
the Mexican League, Gardella sought to return to the Giants and was turned down.
Gardella brought suit against his former club, marking the start of several challenges
against Organized Baseball’s reserve clause. The Gardella case goes beyond the scope of
this study. What is important here is that the combination of Gardella’s suit, and the
PCL’s effort to become a third major league were challenges to Organized Baseball’s
fundamental business practices – territorial rights and the reserve clause. 30
Within this context, the Pacific Coast League was in open revolt. They had been
totally frustrated in their attempts to gain major league recognition, within the framework
of baseball law. Between 1948 and 1951, the PCL threaten to break from the National
Association and operate as an outlaw league. During the 1951 winter meetings, Ford
Frick announced a plan to elevate the minor leagues to major league status. A new
classification above Triple A was established for leagues or associations with at least
eight teams whose consumer markets included at least 10 million people, possessed
ballparks with a combined seating of 120,000 that had an averaged paid attendance of
over 2.25 million for the preceding five years. Once a minor league reached this “open”
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classification, a new set of conditions had to be met to achieve major league status.
These included: a consumer market of 15 million, ballpark capacity of more than 25,000
for each franchise, and a paid attendance of at least 3.5 million for each of the previous
three years. Major League Baseball had raised the bar so high that it was problematic for
any Triple A league to gain major league status. According to the census figures in 1950,
the combined population of PCL cities was a little over 4.5 million. Their seating
capacities for their ballparks were 117,850. More troubling, the PCL’s attendance, along
with several other minor leagues, began to decline sharply. In 1949, the minors drew 41
million fans with 49 leagues and 446 teams. By 1953, attendance dwindled to 22 million,
38 leagues, and 284 teams. Major League owners had no intentions of expanding their
infrastructure. 31
However, by 1950 Organized Baseball found itself being pressured on several
fronts. First, efforts to crush the Liberty Broadcasting System occurred almost at the
same time the Supreme Court was examining baseball’s antitrust exemption. New York
Yankees’ prospect George Toolson filed suit against his employer on the grounds of
being deprived, through the reserve clause and blacklisting, of his professional means of
livelihood. When Tooslon v New York Yankees reached the Supreme Court, a principle
argument was that by entering into contractual agreements with television baseball was
engaging in interstate commerce. Organized Baseball was wary of negotiating a national
television contract until the court ruled on this case. The minor leagues garnered support
from Congress to convert the 1950 version of Rule 1(d) into law.

Senator Edwin

Johnson, a senior minority member of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee and president of the Western League (Class A), introduced legislation to
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legalize Rule 1(d). Johnson asserted that television was destroying the minor leagues.
He arranged hearings to put pressure on the major leagues to end the game of the week
and back his legislation. Organized Baseball managed to avoid this potential minefield of
court litigation and proposed legislation. Chicago Federal Court Judge John P. Barnes
ruled that the clubs had a right to control and profit from broadcast of their own games,
and the Supreme Court reaffirmed baseball’s antitrust exemption in the Toolson case. 32
Second, in July 1951 Brooklyn Congressman Emanuel Celler of the House
Judiciary Committee opened an extensive series of hearings before a subcommittee
charged with the “study of monopoly power.” He called a number of representatives of
Organized Baseball and asked for their justification regarding their restrictive economic
practices and the sport’s antitrust exemption. Celler raised a number of uncomfortable
issues that included the farm system, the reserve clause, territorial rights, the exclusion of
the West Coast and other cities from the major leagues, and the treatment of minor league
players. Various individuals with agendas and grievances against Organized Baseball,
ranging from disgruntled players to officials from the West Coast who lobbied for big
league franchises, were given the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee.
Knowing how sensitive major league owners were to charges of monopoly, Los Angeles
supervisor Roach accused them of conspiring to keep Los Angeles from becoming a
“member of the major league family.”

Republican Congressman Patrick Hillings

pressured the owners to either expand to the West Coast, or assist the PCL to become a
third major league. Baseball officials, including (now former) Commissioner Chandler,
NL President and Commissioner designate Ford Frick, AL President Will Harridge, and
Chicago Cubs’ owner Phil Wrigley, were also summoned and subjected to lengthy
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questioning.

In the end, however, the subcommittee made no recommendation and

Congress took no action. 33
Major League Baseball managed to survive the external pressure brought on by
the Pacific Coast League’s attempts to become a third major league, Supreme Court
rulings, court litigations, and extensive congressional hearings. Expanding or revising
major league baseball’s infrastructure rested solely in the hands of the owners. The
PCL’s plight resulted in the magnates establishing a policy that an individual owner
could relocate their franchise to a new market, if they were willing to bear the expense.
The attempts of local boosters and politicians in Los Angeles to lure a major league
franchise frustrated the PCL’s efforts to elevate their entire league and whetted the
appetites of MLB owners, with struggling franchises, to move to this growing market.
These boosters’ endeavors, however, were thwarted by MLB’s territorial rights, the lack
of a suitable stadium, and their failure to establish an effective coalition of politicians and
businessmen to advance the project. Yet the major league magnates had to come to grips
with the changes in demography, in the postwar economy, and civic boosters pressuring
the owners to bring big league baseball to their growing cities. By 1950 major league
attendance began to decline, dropping sharply to 17,227,000. Two years later, sixteen
teams could only draw approximately fifteen million customers.

During the

congressional hearings AL President Will Harridge admitted that the league had
collectively subsidized the fledgling St. Louis Browns. Faced with these issues, major
league baseball’s consumer market would be altered, breaking the logjam of big league
franchises residing in the Northeast and Midwest for half a century. 34
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IF YOU BUILD IT THEY WILL COME
In the 1950s, major league baseball’s consumer market was impacted by the
demographic changes in American cities, the impact of technology, and the new
consumerism.

Historian George Lipsitz states “elite populations and industries

abandoned older neighborhoods in pursuit of expansion to inexpensive land and low cost
labor in the south and west.” Between 1940 and 1970, the west and south increased their
share of the nation’s income from 33% to 43% and their population rose from 42% in
1940 to 48% in 1970. “Sunbelt” cities escaped years of wear and tear, allowing them to
offer lower taxes and more pleasant surroundings to industries seeking to relocate. They
could do so precisely because the desire to escape the effects of urban growth had
adversely impacted upon the older industrial cities in the first place. 35
Simultaneously, government spending in the postwar era stimulated economic
growth and prosperity.

Federal home loans policies, defense spending, highway

construction, and urban renewal contributed immensely in allowing the federal
government to channel tax dollars into the private sector.

To urban America,

government’s role in capital accumulation manifested itself in federal aid, and also in
local pro-growth coalitions seeking to use public funds as a catalyst for economic
expansion.
The culmination of the demographic trends, government policy, and business
interest fused itself into what can best be described as the suburban-industrial complex.
At the peak of the great European immigration in the early twentieth century, 1.2 million
new immigrants came to America in a single year. During the 1950s, the same number
moved to the suburbs every year. For example, Irving, Texas had a population of 2,621
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in 1950; ten years later 45,000 people lived there. That same decade the total population
increase was only 28 million. 36
Eastern cities, like Brooklyn and Boston, suffered from the forces that helped
shaped western and southern cities like Los Angeles and Houston. Defense spending
shifted tax dollars from the East Coast to the West Coast. FHA loans providing mortgage
insurance for single-family homeowners’ subsidized new and growing suburban cities,
but this growth had negative consequences for older multi-family dominated cities like
Brooklyn and Boston. Moreover, the federal highway program provided industry the
means to move away from the older industrial centers like New York. This exodus of the
population to the suburbs left behind deteriorated formerly middle class neighborhoods.37
The process of suburbanization coincided with an encore performance of the
automobile revolution. From 1945 to 1960, the number of cars in America increased by
133 percent. Under the Highway Act of 1956 Congress appropriated $32 billion to build
41,000 miles of highway.

With the government providing loans for new suburban

homes, building highways that went to those homes, and with an economy structured
primarily around the consumption of new housing and automobiles, a spiral of sustained
prosperity and growth occurred.
Consumerism represented one of the essential elements of this prosperity.
Recreation was a primary focus of this “new consumerism.” The average family in the
suburbs earned roughly $6,500, seventy percent higher than the average income for the
rest of the nation. More than eight million people traveled abroad in the 1950s. With all
the new automobiles and highways, people who stayed at home helped to create a new
industry of domestic tourism, visiting national parks, and providing consumer amusement
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areas like Disneyland. Organized Baseball was in the midst of competing with other
forms of amusement, spurred by entrepreneurs who saw an opportunity. 38
By the end of the 1952 season, these changes in demography, in the economy, and
technology were influential in altering major league baseball’s consumer market. In
response to these changes, the owners amended their regulations. Previously, a franchise
shift required a unanimous vote from the owners of both leagues under Rule 1(c) of the
National Agreement. At the leagues’ 1952 winter meeting, the owners ruled that a team
could move with a unanimous consent of its own league. The other league could not
block the move, if the invaded area was the property of a club in the same league.
Indemnity payments would be made to both the minor league and the pre-empted club.
Amendment to Rule 1(c) facilitated major league baseball’s expansion process. 39
It was within this context that Milwaukee, Wisconsin became one of several cities
ripe for either prospective league expansion or franchise relocation. Referred to as the
“German Athens,” Milwaukee was in the midst of a dramatic transformation that saw the
old city of ethnic neighborhoods and aging factories give way to a modern metropolis
built on the service industries. Milwaukee was the 13th largest city in America, as its
population increased from 587,472 in 1940 to 637,392 a decade later. Between 1940 and
1970, the number of housing units in the Milwaukee metropolitan area almost doubled,
increasing from 238,514 to 449,044. At the peak of the wave in the 1950s, new homes
were popping up at the rate of nearly 1,000 a month. Milwaukee County was emblematic
of the encore performance of the automobile revolution. The number of motor vehicles
registered in the county rose from 177,969 to 319,071 in 1955, a 79 percent increase in
ten years. 40
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To understand how Milwaukee became a coveted city for possible big league
expansion, it is necessary to analyze the forces that led to the construction of Milwaukee
County Stadium. As a member of the American Association, the Milwaukee Brewers
played in Borchert Field, and according to Neil Sullivan, this “ancient marvel” added to
the special quality of baseball in the midwest. Borchert Field was characterized as an
“undersized firetrap shoehorned into a single city block at Eighth and Chambers.” Few
seats afforded a decent vantage of the field, and truculent storms occasionally blew parts
of the structure onto neighboring homes. Talk of replacing the ball park began as early as
1909, when Charles Whitnall, a banker and member of both the city’s Public Land
Commission and the County’s Park Commission, suggested the construction of a sports
stadium next to the Menomonee River parkway. Efforts to build the new ballpark were
thwarted by America’s entry into World War I and the idea died on the planning table. 41
The first concerted efforts to build a municipal stadium began in the 1930s. Two
proposals, one in the local city government – the common council – and the other in the
County Board of Supervisors, marked the start of Milwaukee’s political involvement in
stadium building. On September 1, 1931, Alderman Charles C. Schad introduced a
resolution in the common council, asking for the construction of a 50,000-seat facility.
Since construction costs were low during the Depression era, Schad estimated that the
stadium would cost $300,000. Concurrently, Milwaukee County Supervisor Raymond
Moore introduced a resolution in the county board asking for a legal opinion on whether
the county could build a stadium. The corporation counsel replied in the affirmative, if
the project was designated as a war memorial. Thus the municipal stadium would serve
as a memorial for soldiers who died in World War I. On October 27, 1936, the county
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board adopted the Moore resolution and took the initial steps to seek a federal Public
Works Administration (PWA) grant. However, it took the county two years to submit
their application and by that time all PWA projects had been closed down. Temporarily,
the board abandoned the idea to build the stadium. 42
A fundamental obstacle that stalled efforts to build the new stadium was the
selection of a suitable location. Neither the county supervisors nor the common council
could agree on a prospective site. On March 8, 1938, the county board authorized a study
of possible locations for a county memorial stadium.

County Supervisor Frederick

Heath, founder of the newspaper the Social Democratic Herald, recommended the Story
quarry as the location for the new stadium. Named after one of the original families that
settled in Milwaukee, Hiram and Harry Story began quarry operations in 1850, after a
windstorm revealed some of the hardest limestone in Wisconsin. The quarry operations
ceased operations in the mid-1930s when the land was annexed to the city.
Simultaneously, the Milwaukee common council established a special site committee,
which recommended that the council acquire 15 acres of tax delinquent land at North
Holton Street and West Capitol Drive. The committee proposed the construction of a
26,000-seat facility at an estimated cost of $650,000. However, in 1940, the city land
commission thwarted this proposal by indicating the location was too far from the
population center. The commission also recommended the Story quarry. 43
America’s entry into World War II delayed attempts to build the stadium. By the
end of the war, Supervisor Bert Busby introduced a resolution in the county board that,
according to the Milwaukee Journal, “started the final push.” The resolution called for
building a stadium as a war memorial – this time honoring World War II veterans – and
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recommended that the county park commission study the cost. More important, for the
first time the city and the county joined forces. Meeting separately on February 19, 1946,
both the common council and the county board appointed a committee to work jointly on
the project. In September, the two committees developed a joint report, recommending
that the stadium be built by the county on the Story quarry and that the city improve the
surrounding streets. 44
On February 24, 1947, the county board voted to build a stadium. Despite the
joint report’s recommending the stadium be built on the Story quarry site, the board took
no action on selecting a suitable location. Rather, they referred two resolutions calling
for specific locations to the highway committee. One resolution recommended the Story
quarry, while the other favored the Haymarket square, located at North 5th and West Vliet
Street. Yet another proposal called for the location of the stadium north of the state fair
park. 45
Haggling over a suitable location delayed attempts to begin construction. On
January 11, 1949, the county board voted to approve the Story location, if a city
sponsored referendum on a $3.5 million bond issue to improve streets passed. The
referendum failed. The county board reconsidered other locations. They came within
one vote of approving the Haymarket square, located on North 5th and West Vliet. The
board voted to build the stadium at the state fair park site, but later rescinded its actions
because the state would not give the county the land without certain reservations
unacceptable to the board. 46
Despite the constant bickering over selecting a suitable location, the county board
continued to flesh out the details to build the stadium.

This action seemed to be
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premature on the board’s part, since it had yet to choose a suitable location. However,
their actions appeared to be consistent with the 1946 joint report that recommended the
Story site. In any event, the park commission was assigned this daunting task, and one of
its first moves was to begin negotiations for additional land with the local and federal
governments. The city owned 34 acres of the Story site, including the quarry itself. The
federal government owned land south of the Story site, which the county wanted to lease
for extra parking space. The commission established a special stadium committee to
handle the details. The committee, headed by William R. McGovern, a former president
of the Wisconsin Telephone Company, was, according to the Milwaukee Journal, to
become an important force in pushing forward the efforts to build the stadium. 47
Simultaneously, the Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC) was pivotal in moving
forward the stadium project. McGovern was a member of the GMC and this coalition
exemplified a booster group that were eternal optimists, growth oriented, and willing to
take risks. The GMC grew from a group of fifteen Rotarians in 1939 to represent the
leadership of 200 of the city’s largest corporations. Although its roster was limited to
150 members, the GMC owned or managed at least a quarter of the business property in
the city, with a concentration on the larger end of the scale. The GMC’s involvement in
the stadium project represented an overall larger effort to rebuild Milwaukee’s cultural
infrastructure.

In addition to the stadium, the GMC urged commitments for the

construction of a new civic center, library addition, zoo, indoor sports arena, museum, art
center, and an express road from the airport to downtown. 48
On July 20, 1949, McGovern got Senator Alexander Wiley to introduce a bill in
Congress. With the GMC’s support, the bill passed and was signed by President Harry
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Truman. Under the terms of the legislation, the county would buy 93 acres at half the
appraised value, and lease another 22 acres for one dollar a year. The 93 acres, which the
city needed for expressway purposes, cost the county $35,000.
Although the preliminary plans for construction were completed by June 1950,
the county board confronted several obstacles that delayed efforts to build the facility.
The board voted to approve the plans and asked the finance committee to recommend a
financing plan. On July 25, the board approved the issuance of $3.5 million worth of
bonds. One month later, the board sold two million dollars worth of bonds to a syndicate
headed by the First National Bank of Chicago at a net interest cost, after premium, of
1.172%. However, efforts to begin construction coincided with America’s entry in the
Korean conflict, resulting in a steel shortage. Despite this unexpected delay, on October
19 ground was broken to lay the stadium’s foundation. 49
The county board faced another setback that could have killed the stadium
project. On October 26, 1950, the National Production Authority (NPA) in Washington,
D. C. banned construction on any new recreational facilities. It appeared the stadium
project would be stalled for the duration of the Korean conflict. However, projects that
began prior to the ban could possibly receive an exemption.

With this in mind,

McGovern went to Washington and put the county’s case before NPA head William H.
Harrison. On November 3, Harrison granted the county permission to build the stadium.
He indicated that an exception was being made because to halt the project would mean an
“unusual handicap” here. But Harrison pointed out that the agency could not provide a
priority on materials for the stadium. 50
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By the spring of 1952, two-thirds of the stadium had been completed when the
project confronted another delay. In April, five trade unions went on strike, bringing the
project to a virtual halt. Once the strike was settled, stadium construction went smoothly,
and by the spring of 1953, Milwaukee County Stadium was ready for occupancy.
According to the Milwaukee Journal, the city and the county had invested a reported
$4,843,000 in the facility. 51
Upon the completion of Milwaukee County Stadium, politicians and civic leaders
had aspirations of luring a major league franchise. County officials had envisioned a
structure that would be adaptable to the needs of minor league baseball and professional
football yet could be converted to major league standards if the need arose. They
ambitiously estimated that big league baseball would amass between $5 to 10 million
annually for the city of Milwaukee. Roughly half of this attendance was expected to
come from outside the city. Civic leaders envisioned thousands of visitors drawn by
baseball would boost the sales of stores, and the patronage of hotels, restaurants, and
other businesses. The desire to bring major league baseball to Milwaukee was not
without foundation.

Throughout the course of construction, Commissioner Albert

Chandler proposed an expansion plan that would increase the number of league clubs in
both circuits from eight to ten clubs.

Cities under consideration for prospective

expansion included Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Milwaukee, and Montreal.
Conversely, the GMC made overtures to lure the most coveted franchise ripe for
relocation – the St. Louis Browns. The Milwaukee Journal reported that GMC President
Clifford A. Randall, an attorney, began negotiations with Browns’ owner Bill Veeck to
bring his fledgling AL franchise to their growing city. 52
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The GMC’s proposal to Veeck coincided with his efforts to relocate the Browns.
Upon acquiring the Browns in the middle of the 1951 season, Veeck had one lofty
objective – run the Cardinals out of St. Louis. This goal seemed plausible, since Veeck
enjoyed two advantages. Cardinals owner Fred Saigh was under indictment for tax fraud,
and more importantly, the Redbirds had dropped out of contention after a 1946 World
Series appearance.

Concurrently, during the 1952 season Veeck quietly contacted

individual American League owners to obtain their support for a move in the event his
battle with the Cardinals went badly. At the winter meetings of that same year, Veeck
informed his fellow AL owners that the Browns might have to leave St. Louis before the
start of next season and that he would present them with his plans at the spring meeting in
Tampa. By February 1953, the Browns’ future was compromised in the Mound City
when the Busch Brewery Company purchased the Cardinals. Veeck recognized he could
not compete with the wealthy Busch and decided to move his Browns. 53
Veeck’s desire was to return to Milwaukee, the scene of one of his greatest
franchise building success. He owned the Milwaukee Brewers franchise in the early
1940s, where his flair for promotional schemes came to fruition. The completion of
Milwaukee County Stadium and the GMC’s overtures made Veeck’s return there more
appealing. But the Browns owner had one problem – Boston Braves owner Lou Perini
owned the Milwaukee Brewers franchise.
Louis R. Perini was born in Ashland, Massachusetts on November 29, 1903.
When Perini was nine, he already held lofty ambitions of owning a baseball club. He
organized a team of boys, named them the Ashland Dreadnaughts, and went about raising
funds from local merchants to provide the club with uniforms. His father, Bonfiglio
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Perini, owned a construction company and when he died in 1924, Louis became president
of B. Perini & Sons, Inc. Along with his brothers, Joseph and Charles, Louis had the
small construction firm expanding rapidly. By 1936, B. Perini & Sons, Inc. was large
enough to handle the maintenance on the Cape Cod Canal. 54
Perini formed a partnership with C. Joseph Maney and Guido L. Rugo. Maney
began his career as a timekeeper on Boston’s Washington Street subway tunnel. By
1931, he formed the C. J. Maney Company and by 1945 the firm was doing $30 million
worth of post war construction contracts. Rugo began as a worker for the Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corporation and later he became the treasurer of the Rugo Construction
Company. Better known as the “Three Little Steam Shovels,” the three men first met as
competitive bidders on numerous construction projects and later joined forces on larger
jobs such as deep pressure tunnels, ordinance depots, and highway and airport
construction. Among their projects were the Tuscarora Mountain tunnel in Pennsylvania,
and the Park River Conduit in Hartford, Connecticut. In the decade before he took over
the Braves, Perini’s company did more than $100,000,000 worth of business. 55
In 1941, Perini got involved in baseball at a time when the Boston Braves
exemplified the National League’s version of the St. Louis Browns – an exercise in
futility and mediocrity. Unlike their AL predecessor, the Braves won two NL pennants
and one world championship in fifty years. In 1914, the infamous “Miracle Braves”
defeated Connie Mack’s Philadelphia Athletics in four games. In other years, the Braves
finished second once, third twice, fourth seven times, fifth five times, sixth nine times,
seventh fifteen times, and eighth nine times. Braves owner Charles F. Adams, a grocerychain magnate, had to sell the club because of his connection with the Suffolk Downs
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racetrack. Fifteen Bostonians purchased stock, including Perini, Rugo, and Maney. The
Braves stumbled along under mass ownership for three years, when Perini, along with
Rugo and Maney, offered to buy out the other stockholders for what they paid or sell
their stock on the same terms. The others sold and the steam shovels quickly replenished
the club’s treasury.

In 1947, they bought the Milwaukee Brewers for a reported

$270,000. 56
Although he did not devise Veeck like promotional schemes, Perini did operate
the Braves with panache and imagination. The steam shovels introduced a new Braves
theme song, four marching bands, a chorus of 7,500 boys from settlement houses and
boys’ clubs, and an Indian chief from the Wampanog tribe on Cape Cod, Chief Wild
Horse. For night games, Perini outfitted the Braves in satin uniforms, installed neon foul
poles, and set off fireworks. The Braves gave away automobiles and free trips to spring
training, placed suggestion boxes around the ball park, and became the first major league
team to offer fried clams at their concession stands.
The steam shovels were fortunate enough to inherit executive John Quinn, a
Boston college graduate whose father Bob had run the club since 1936. Quinn and the
new owners were committed to making the Braves a NL pennant contender. They
expanded the farm system, lured manager Billy Southworth from the Cardinals with a
large contract offer, and purchased several veteran players, many of them from the
Redbirds. While many of these players did not help the Braves, others like Bob Elliott,
Earl Torgeson, and Alvin Dark paid dividends. After a $3.5 million investment, a
National League pennant, and four consecutive profitable seasons, the Boston Braves
were out of debt with a reported surplus of $4,537 in 1949. 57
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By 1950, however, the Braves fortune began to sour. The club faltered on the
field, major league attendance began to decline, and the Braves were unable to compete
with their AL rivals the Red Sox. The Braves attendance experienced a sharp decline
from a high of 1,455,439 in 1948 to 281,000 in 1952. Perini and his partners seemed
powerless to prevent the slide.
To be sure, the Braves’ anemic attendance influenced Perini’s decision to relocate
his Braves to Milwaukee. Despite the club landing in the black in 1949, the profits
amassed did not justify the huge investment the steam shovels had made. Yet there was
still a possibility that Perini could have stayed in Boston. According to the Sporting
News, he gave Boston at least one more year to turn things around. If the situation
remained bleak in the Hub, Perini would move his Braves before the start of the 1954
season. Several factors, however, occurred that changed his original plans. 58
First, Perini bought out his long time partners, C. Joseph Maney and Guido Rugo,
making him, along with his brothers Joseph and Charles, the Braves’ sole proprietors.
During the winter of 1952, Perini told his stockholders that to ensure a better operation
one person or one family should own the club. The Perinis offered to buy the stock of the
other shareholders, paying them the same amount they originally paid. In this way
individual shareholders would not have to shoulder the losses the ball club accrued.
More important, if Perini decided to move his Braves from Boston, he would not have to
worry about offending any of his partners. According to sportswriter Al Hirshberg,
Perini stated that Maney would have never stood for the Braves’ transfer under any
circumstances. 59

38
Bill Veeck’s desire to relocate to Milwaukee and the GMC’s endeavor to lure a
major league franchise constituted the second factor. By late 1952, Veeck offered to sell
Sportsman Park to Frederick C. Miller, CEO of the Miller Brewing Company and a GMC
member, for a reported $800,000. This revenue would be used to relocate the Triple A
Brewers to another city and allow the Browns to relocate to Milwaukee. At the same
time, both the GMC and Milwaukee’s local politicians became more aggressive in their
attempts to lure big league ball there. GMC President Clifford Randall offered Perini
$500,000 to move the Brewers to Toledo, Ohio to enable the Browns to move to
Milwaukee. 60
External pressure came also from Milwaukee Journal sportswriter R. G. Lynch
and Mayor Frank Zeidler. In an exchange of telegrams between Lynch and Perini, the
Braves owner indicated that he would not stand in the way of Milwaukee receiving a
major league team. However, Perini insisted that the Braves’ only condition for leaving
would be relocating the Brewers to a city “with as good potential as Milwaukee.” Toledo
guaranteed a minimum attendance of 200,000 a year for three years, but since that city
had lost its franchise to Charleston, West Virginia in 1951, Perini evidently took the
position that the Ohio city didn’t measure up. Given the overall decline in major and
minor league attendance, his reservations were understandable. 61
Simultaneously, Mayor Zeidler contacted Braves’ Vice-President Joseph Cairnes
and stated that the club did not “want to be in a position of preventing a major league
franchise from coming to Milwaukee...” The people of Milwaukee had demonstrated
“their willingness to support a major team erecting a substantial stadium and playing
field.” Zeidler added: “The Braves organization would not want their Milwaukee club to
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be playing to a hostile citizenry...” The mayor was confident that Braves officials would
“review the whole position very earnestly in order to satisfy the Milwaukee public and
the needs of baseball generally.” Concurrently, several organizations suggested that the
county cancel its contract with Boston that allowed the Brewers to use the stadium. The
contract provided for a 30-day notice of cancellation, but it also could be terminated only
if a major league club moved into the city. 62
Public pressure and publicity generated pressure not only on Perini, but also on
major league baseball. Mayor Zeidler and Governor Walter Kohler, Jr. wrote letters to
Perini and to Commissioner Ford Frick, calling attention to the interests of the people.
Wisconsin Congressman Clem Zablocki looked into the possibilities of antitrust action.
Clifford Randall and stadium director Frederick Mendelson garnered enthusiastic support
from business leaders and fans to bring major league baseball to the German Athens.
The possibility of antitrust action represented the third factor. The fact that
Congressman Zablocki considered this possibility was a cause for concern for major
league baseball. As Boston Globe sportswriter Harold Kaese accurately pointed out: “It
did not take an act of Congress to break up the old league batting order, only an
investigation by a Congressional committee.” Major league owners did not want to risk
the chance of Congress lifting its antitrust exemption. More important, Perini recognized
the need for major league baseball to expand into these growing metropolises. He was
quoted as saying that the major leagues could not continue to ignore cities like Los
Angeles, Seattle, Houston, and Montreal, but expansion should occur within the
framework of baseball law and not by an act of Congress. 63
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Finally, Lou Perini represented a new generation that took over the ownership of
major league teams. Marshall states that the gentlemen sportsmen were followed during
the 1940s by a new generation of owners – the capitalists. These men who either earned
or inherited their money viewed the sport as a financial opportunity and operated their
clubs solely on business grounds. In addition to the steam shovels buying the Braves and
Busch acquiring the Cardinals, Del Webb, Larry MacPhail, and Dan Topping bought the
Yankees from Jacob Ruppert’s estate. MacPhail was a baseball man, but Topping and
Webb came from completely different backgrounds.

In 1947, the heirs of Barney

Dreyfuss sold the Pittsburgh Pirates to a contingent that included Indianapolis banker
Frank McKinney, lawyer/businessman Thomas P. Johnson, real estate mogul John
Galbreath, and Hollywood entertainer Bing Crosby. Finally, Bob Carpenter, a scion of
the wealthy Du Pont family, purchased the Philadelphia Phillies. 64
Combined, these factors led Lou Perini to move the Braves to Milwaukee.
Pressure generated from politicians, the GMC, and Bill Veeck placed the Braves owner
in the role of a villain, if he prevented major league ball from coming to the beer capital.
The negative publicity alone was not in Perini’s best interests. More important, since
Perini saw the Braves as a financial opportunity, it made no business sense to continue
investing substantial sums of money into a losing proposition.

It should be noted,

however, that moving to Milwaukee did not guarantee the Braves’ financial predicament
would improve. In fact the Braves were moving from a larger market to a smaller one.
However, the conditions in Boston made it untenable to remain there. As sportswriter Al
Hirshberg pointed out, Braves Field had long outlived its usefulness, “because there was
nothing very good about it.” The ballpark was located on a single streetcar line, off a
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single main thoroughfare. It had inadequate parking and the main entrance was on a
dead-end street, opposite a busy armory whose trucks used the same street. Braves Field
was one of the hardest public places in Boston to reach. More troubling to Perini,
advanced ticket sales were 35 percent behind the previous season. Faced with these
issues, Milwaukee would have major league baseball for the start of the 1953 season, but
it would be Perini’s Braves and not Veeck’s Browns who would move there. 65
When Perini refused to sell his Triple A Brewers, or relocate them to another city,
Veeck turned his attention to Baltimore. Perini quietly established a coalition among the
NL owners to move his franchise. On March 18, 1953, the NL owners unanimously
approved Perini’s request to move his Braves to Milwaukee. Brooklyn Dodgers owner
Walter O’Malley made the motion that Perini be allowed to make the shift. New York
Giants magnate Horace Stoneham seconded the motion. On the same day, the American
Association approved the Brewers’ transfer to Toledo and Perini made a $50,000
indemnity payment to the circuit. Because the Braves relocated into the western half of
the National League, the owners revised the playing schedule. The Pittsburgh Pirates
moved into the eastern division and took over the Braves schedule. The Braves took over
the Pirates schedule.
Simultaneously, the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors voted unanimously
to permit the Braves to play in the new stadium. Under the terms of the lease, the county
would rent the stadium to the Braves for a nominal sum of $1,000 a year for the first two
years. For the next three years the county would receive five percent of the revenues
from the gate receipts and most of the concession sales. The county would provide
additional lighting to conform to major league standards, erect additional permanent seats
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“sufficient to meet the reasonable requirements of the National League,” and provide
additional office space and concession stands.

What constituted “National League

standards” was not made explicit. The Braves received all revenue from broadcasting
and telecasting of games for the first five years, subject to renegotiation once the contract
expired. The Braves agreed to maintain the field, while the county reimbursed the club
for maintenance costs incurred due to events other than baseball. The county would have
all advertising rights at the stadium, except for those involved in radio and television
broadcasts. The Braves would operate concessions for all events, including football, but
the county was expected to receive a share of the revenues for events other than
baseball.66
Clearly Perini received a generous leasing agreement. The price for obtaining big
league status was substantially high considering the huge investment the city of
Milwaukee had made. County officials expected to generate revenue for the city by
staging auxiliary events like boxing matches, semiprofessional and black baseball games
and basketball contests. With the Braves as their tenant, the county expected to expand
their market potential to attract fans from cities like Racine, Kenosha, Sheboygan,
Oshkosh, and Green Bay Wisconsin. Undoubtedly they envisioned these fans spending
consumer dollars in Milwaukee. It is problematic to suggest that this was the case.
County officials and city fathers probably overestimated the potential “new” dollars the
city could generate with a major league franchise. What is certain is that the Braves
would benefit significantly by drawing fans from within this 115-mile radius of the city.
Moreover, the Braves’ leasing agreement marked the start of post-World War II cities
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offering attractive incentives to encourage major league franchises to relocate to their
growing metropolises. 67
Nevertheless, to this generation of politicians and local boosters this large
investment was worth it to them to revitalize Milwaukee’s cultural infrastructure. The
Braves relocation to Milwaukee coincided with the city riding a wave of unprecedented
prosperity, rising to new heights as an industrial power, and surging to an all-time
population peak.

Milwaukee welcomed new institutions that included an urban

university, basketball and hockey teams, and an ultra-modern Memorial Center.
Relegated for decades to a position in the second tier of American cities, Milwaukee
aspired to higher things. 68
The Braves illustrated the importance civic leaders and local politicians placed on
obtaining major league status to redefine its national identity in the 1950s. Mayor Zeidler
typified the rhetoric of local politicians when he stated that Milwaukee had “long felt we
were a capable people but because of our peculiar geography...our voice has not been
heard in the land.” The mayor added: “This [the Braves] is a means of letting people
know we exist.” “Have you heard,” the Greater Milwaukee Committee asked in its 1954
report. “We live not in Milwaukee (Wis.), WE LIVE IN MILWAUKEE!” Clifford
Randall stated the Braves move to Milwaukee was “an historical example of the fact that
the community can be as great as its citizens want it to be.” The rhetoric of these postWorld War II boosters and politicians served as a form of ideological legitimacy to
concentrate economic and political power to bring major league baseball to their growing
metropolis. 69
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On April 14, 1953, the Milwaukee Braves played the St. Louis Cardinals in their
home opener. Centerfielder Bill Bruton hit a solo home run in the bottom of the tenth
inning to give the Braves a 3-2 victory before a reported crowd of 34,157 fans.
Milwaukee’s love affair with their Braves had begun.
CONCLUSION
Major League Baseball’s expansion process was influenced significantly by the
Pacific Coast League’s desire to become a third major league. Their efforts were in
response to Donald Barnes’ attempt to relocate his St. Louis Browns – along with civic
boosters enticing them – to Los Angeles. PCL officials responded to this encroachment
into their territory by seeking to elevate their entire league to major league classification,
within the parameters of baseball law. Major league owners reacted by establishing a
policy allowing individual magnates to relocate their clubs into a new market, if they
were willing to bear the expense and make the necessary negotiations. Throughout the
PCL’s plight, the stadium remained the sole constant that determined whether a league or
city was a “potential major league territory.” Given the size of their ballparks in the late
1940s, major league owners never seriously considered elevating the PCL to a big league
classification.
The Pacific Coast League’s attempt to become a third major league occurred
simultaneously with the changing demographics of American cities, changes in
technology and in the political economy, and the emergence of the new consumerism. In
some ways, the PCL residing in the fastest growing region of the country frustrated their
efforts. The league’s largest city – Los Angeles – grew disproportionately larger than the
other league cities. Civic boosters like Supervisor Leonard Roach and sportswriter
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Vincent Flaherty, sought to distanced themselves from the other PCL cities and draw an
existing MLB franchise or become an expansion team. Their endeavors were constantly
thwarted by MLB’s territorial principle. The National League appeared to be more
receptive to expansion. However, because baseball law required a unanimous consent
from the owners of both leagues to either relocate a franchise or add new teams. These
delaying tactics led to extensive congressional hearings to pressure the owners to expand.
Combined with a decline in overall attendance and the threat of lifting MLB’s antitrust
exemption, the owners amended their bylaws to facilitate the expansion process. They
maintained their policy that allowed an individual owner to move their franchise, if they
took on that responsibility, however.
The Boston Braves’ relocation to Milwaukee coincided with civic leaders and
local politicians’ endeavors to revitalize the city’s cultural infrastructure.

The

construction of Milwaukee County Stadium and luring the Braves from the Hub served to
shatter the city’s second tier image and redefine its national identity. Yet it still required
a significant degree of external pressure to coerce Lou Perini to move his club. Unlike
the civic leaders in Los Angeles, Milwaukee’s politicians and boosters formed a strong
coalition to bring big league ball to the German Athens. Ironically, the city benefited
from the constant bickering over finding a suitable location to build the facility. By the
time Milwaukee County Stadium was completed, major league baseball was primed to
move its struggling franchises.
Yet it appears that the city of Milwaukee paid a high price for obtaining major
league status and redefining its national identity. The County Supervisors and the GMC
probably overestimated the prospective windfall they expected to receive by housing the
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Braves. Their efforts did exemplify the willingness of post-World War II cities to build
lavish stadiums, offering incentives to hard to resist, luring an existing franchise or
encouraging MLB to expand. For major league baseball, however, franchise relocation
marked the start of a dramatic restructuring of the industry’s consumer market into its
current configuration.
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